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Wh y  are  Foreclosures Highest in African American Neighborhoods? 
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Abstract 
Foreclosures have become one of the most important urban problems facing cities.  Our 
goal is to better understand factors that affect variation in neighborhood foreclosures in a typical, 
mid-si zed U.S. city—Louisville, Kentucky. While previous findings indicate that a key 
explanatory variable positively affecting neighborhood foreclosures is the proportion of 
minorities, our analysis finds that the effect of percent non-white is impacted by several key 
intervening variables, including absence of neighborhood walkability, presence of investor 
fo reclosures, and prevalence of hi gh cost loans.  In  the past, walkability and investor behavior 
have largely been ignored by social scientists studying neighborhood variation in foreclosures. 
First, we look at how speculation by investors in majority black neighborhoods partially 
explains recent increases in foreclosures.  An analysis of homeowner foreclosures finds that race 
loses its explanatory power.  Second, we argue that low walkability scores lead toincreases in 
fo reclosures because of neighborhood devaluation due to increased fuel costs. Third, in 
agreement with other observers, we show that the preponderance of high interest rate loansin 
poor minority neighborhoods also produced higher than average foreclosures.  Together, we 
believe these three factors help to better explain the contemporary causes of greater foreclosures 
in black neighborhoods. 4
Introduction 
Foreclosures are one of the most important problems facing citiestoday. This problem is 
not only devastating to individuals and households but to neighborhoods as well.  Fo reclosures 
are not equally distributed throughout a city—some neighborhoods exhibit major foreclosure 
problems while other neighborhoods are virtually free of foreclosures. During the recent housing 
market crash and foreclosure crisis, low-income minority neighborhoods were perhaps hit the 
worst.  To better explain this phenomena, this paper seeks to develop a greater understanding of 
how foreclosures vary by neighborhood by introducing three key explanatory variables, two of 
whichare presently excluded from much academic discussion: walkability, investor-owned 
fo reclosures, and hi gh cost loans.  Thispaper uses Louisville, Kentucky, a mid-sized city, as the 
case for study over the initial two years of the crisis, 2007 and 2008. 
Background on the Foreclosure Crisis
Foreclosure is the legal process by which a lender seizes real property from its owner due 
to the owner not making timely mortgage payments.  Upon seizing a property, a bank can 
auction the property to recover some losses from the defaulted loan.  Amid the recent economic 
recession, foreclosures catapulted to national attention in early 2007 when the collapse of the 
national housing price bubble left many borrowers “underwater,” or living in a home worth less 
than the amount owed on the mortgage. The situation was exacerbated when many affected 
homeowners encountered di fficulty refinancing their adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) that 
were about to reset to higher interest rates.  For many, foreclosure became the only option.
Foreclosures have been on the rise since at least the beginning of 2007 with somemedia 
outlets reporting rising foreclosures as early as 2005 (Powell, 2005). RealtyTrac (2009), one of 5
several services that track national foreclosure trends, reported that at the end of 2008, over 3.2 
million foreclosures were reported and had begun proceedings since the start of the crisis in 
2007. Their early-2009 ranking of foreclosure rates by state and metropolitan area placed 
Kentucky forty-se cond among the states and Louisville, the state’s largest city, at 131 out of 203 
metropolitan areas (Realty Tr ac, 2009). 
While once-flourishing Sunbelt states like Nevada, Arizona, and Florida were hit the 
worst by  rising foreclosures, several Midwestern states are also listed in RealtyTrac’s top ten, 
which include Michigan, Illinois, Indiana and Ohio (RealtyTrac, 2008).  Since June 2010, the 
crisis has hit mid-siz ed metropolitan areas, such as McAllen, Texas (where foreclosures have 
increased by 230 percent in the first half of 2010 over 2009 foreclosure rates), Kennewick, 
Washington (up 217 percent), Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi (up 153 percent), Baltimore, 
Maryland (up 130 percent), and Barnstable Town, Massachusetts (up 93 percent; Smart Money, 
2010).  This information indicates that as of 2010 the U.S. may still be in the midst of crisis.  
Because we still may be in the middle of the crisis, it is important to understand all of the factors 
that are causing that crisis, particularly in once flourishing mid-sized cities, and the resulting 
geographic disparities within these communities.
The impact of foreclosure on individuals and families is enormous. The Center for 
Responsible Lending (CRL) estimated that approximately 6.6 million families nationally have 
lost their homes between January 2007 and August 2010, causing a net loss of $502 billion in 
property values since the start of the crisis.  The CRL also estimates that up to 12 million homes 
could be foreclosed upon within the next five years, which would undoubtedly prolong a full 
economic recovery (Center for Responsible Lending, 2010).  Immergluck and Smith (2005) 6
argue that foreclosures have reduced nearby property values in Chicago by more than $598 
million dollars or an average of $159,000 per foreclosure between 1997 and 1998.   
The loss of a home not only hurts a family or an individual financially, but it also causes 
emotional stress, including depression and suicide, as dozens of news outlets, including USA 
Today, have reported (Armour, 2008). A person forced to move from his or her home and 
neighborhood can undergo considerable psychological stress from the loss of community or 
reference groups (Harvey, 1973: Fried, 1963; Wechsler, 1961; Gilderbloom and Appelbaum, 
1988). 
Several well-known commentators, including editorial writers from the Wall Street 
Journal, Charles Krauthammer from The Washington Post, and Lou Dobbs from CNN have put 
the blame on federal government policies that pressured lenders to make bad loans to residents of 
bl ack and low-income communities leading to the glut of fo reclosures that have plagued these 
neighborhoods.  Subprime and predatory loans were often targeted to vulnerable families in such 
neighborhoods. However, these high-pressure practices were not the result of fair lending and 
community development policy.  The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977 bans 
redlining and encourages lenders to make loans to African-Americans in poor neighborhoods
consistent with safe and sound lending practices (see also Apgar and Duda, 2003).  As Squires 
observed (2008a: 3): 
…Federal  financial regulatory agencies were  charged with the responsibility to 
“assess  the  institution’s  record  of  meeting  the  credit  needs  of  i ts  entire 
community, including low and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with 
the safe and sound operation of such institution.”  The goal was to put an end to 
redlining and to increase access to credit for qualified borrowers in areas that had 7
long been underserved. But, again, only “consistent with safe and sound” lending 
practices.  And the law has worked. 
Research by federal agencies, schola rs, and advocates has consistently demonstrated that 
the CRA has met its objective by increasing access to good loans in traditionally underserved 
neighborhoods.  As Janet L. Yellen, President and CEO of the San Francisco Federal Reserve 
Bank, stated in March 2007:
There has been a tendency to conflate the current problems in the subprime 
market with CRA-motivated lending, or with lending to low-in come families in 
general.  I believe it is very important to make a distinction between the two.  
Most of the loans made by depository institutions examined under the CRA have 
not been higher-priced loans, and studies have shown that the CRA has increased 
the volume of responsible lending to low- and moderate-income households.  We 
should not view the current foreclosure trends as justification to abandon the goal 
of expanding access to credit among low-income households, since access to 
cr edit, and the subsequent ability to buy a home, remains one of the most 
important mechanisms we have to help low-income families build wealth over the 
long term. (Squires 2008a: 4).
Literature Review
Many scholars have examined foreclosures by comparing across states, metro areas, or 
cities (Swanstrom and Chapple, 2009; Calem, Hershaff, and Wachter, 2004).  In a similar 
example, Aalbers (2009) takes an expanded look by examining different states, cities, and 
di fferent financial centers both in developing and developed countries. We  believe, however,
that a comparison of local neighborhoods, which we identify using census tracts, is valuable for 8
understanding and explaining the lop-sided variation in neighborhood foreclosures that 
di sproportionately affect poor black neighborhoods. 
Before examining neighborhood-level foreclosures, one must note the factors leading to 
individual mortgage foreclosures.  There are two competing explanations why individual 
homeowners default on their mortgages and eventually enter foreclosure: the ability-to-pay and 
the amount of negative equity (Pederson and Delgadillo, 2007). The first explanation argues that 
homeowners default and enter foreclosure because they cannot make their monthly mortgage 
payments. Th is is often due to income shocks or trigger events such as the loss of employment, 
di vorce, or catastrophic illness (Elmer and Seelig, 1998).  Other researchers note that changes in 
family structures can lead a household to reassess the desirability of their current residential 
arrangement (Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross, 2006). 
In  the alternative explanation, the amount of home equity—rather than monthly 
income—is the key variable (Clauretie and Sirmans, 2003).  Homeowners with substantial equity 
are less likely to default on their mortgages, whereas homeowners with negative equity or a 
hi gher “loan-to-value” ratio are more likely to default.  Home equity lines of credit and second 
mortgages further reduce built-up equity (Pederson and Delgadillo, 2007).  Other individual-
level factors deemed important predictors of mortgage default and foreclosure are income (Van 
Order and Zorn, 2000); minority status of homeowner (Anderson and VanderHoff, 1999); age of 
homeowner (Ambrose and Capone, 1998); and age of home (Pederson and Delgadillo, 2007). 
While the aforementioned literature examines individual-level variables, limited literature 
has examined neighborhood-level predictors of mortgage default and foreclosure rates (Calem, 
Hershaff, and Wachter, 2004; Williams, Nesiba, and McConnell, 2005; Immergluck and Smith, 
2005; Pederson and Delgadillo, 2007; and Grover, Smith, and Todd, 2008).  Immergluck and 9
Smith (2005) emphasize subprime lending prevalence while controlling for demographics and 
economic conditions.  Pederson and Delgadillo (2007) compare residential mortgage default 
rates in high and low-minority census tracts, ultimately claiming that high default rates in 
nonwhite neighborhoods are likely due to persistent economic disadvantages.  Grover, Smith, 
and Todd (2008) examine inter-neighborhood variation explicitly to target foreclosure 
interventions.  They argue that an “accurate [neighborhood-level] credit risk variable is among 
the best predictors of foreclosure” (Grover, Smith, and Todd, 2008: 91). Each of these studies 
hones in on a key predictor—subprime mortgages, racial composition, and credit scores, 
respectively.  These studies analyzed data prior to the recent crash and crisis and ignored the 
impact of investor speculation.  
Baxter and Lauria (2000) also examine foreclosures and neighborhood transition. Lauria 
(1998) contests the idea that foreclosures are related to white flight caused by blacks moving into 
once-white neighborhoods. They find that middle-income, professional whites employed in 
businesses impacted by recession who had recently bought houses with high loan-to-value ratios 
were forced to sell or have their houses foreclosed upon (Baxter and Lauria, 2000).  Similar 
conditions exist in suburban communities during the currently ongoing recession. 
The expansion of subprime lending institutions and exotic mortgage loan products has 
greatly exacerbated the problem of foreclosures in the current recession (Quercia, Stegman, and 
Davis, 2007; see also Foote, etal., 2008).  Su bprime borrowers are expected to be those with 
poor credit histories or who present additional risks to lenders, including self-employment, little 
or no documentation of income, or high debt-to-income ratios (Cutts and Van Order, 2005).  But 
research has demonstrated that at least a third, if not more, of subprime borrowers could have 
qualified for prime loans (Engel and McCoy, 2002).  Quercia, et al. (2007) stated that over one-10
third of new mortgages during the second half of 2005 were subprime.  Quercia, Stegman and 
Davis (2007) blame foreclosures with high interest rate loans on “predatory” mortgages. More 
specifically, their regression and repayment analysis finds that predatory loans are twenty 
percent more likely to enter foreclosure than other mortgages, and mortgages with balloon 
payments are fifty percent more likely to foreclose.  These findings suggest that a neighborhood-
level measure of high cost loans should be an important predictor of foreclosures.  
Case Study of Louisville, Kentucky
Louisville, a medium-sized city that mixes several regional cultures, has historically been 
referred to as the “gateway to the South.” Louisville exhibits a  semiautonomous housing market 
roughly one-hundred miles from other large cities of 50,000 people or more, like Lexington, 
Kentucky, Cincinnati, Ohio, and Indianapolis, Indiana.  Its monocentric shape and distinct 
neighborhoods permit one to delineate neighborhood-level factors influencing foreclosures.  
Louisville, like many other cities in the United States, is segregated by race and class 
(Cummings, 1997). Th e  ci ty is divided into several distinct sections, which can be roughly 
defined and bounded by the interstates, with Interstate 65 being the most significant divider. 
Louisville’s 2003 merger with surrounding Jefferson County—creating Louisville 
Metro—allowed for more effective efforts to collect data on both the urban core (the historic 
fo rmer City of Louisville) and its suburbs.  Louisville Metro now includes two concentric rings 
of suburban neighborhoods within one political jurisdiction demarcated by two beltways—th e 
inner-ring suburbs, b etween the inner and outer beltways (Interstates 264 and265, respectively), 
and the outer-ring suburbs/exurbs beyond the outer beltway (Louisville-Jefferson County Metro, 
2006).  Most of Louisville’s suburbs and the bulk of the Metropolitan Statistical Area’s 11
population are within the newly merged city’s limits, as these suburbs are inside the political 
boundary of Jefferson County.  
Despite its modest ranking mentioned earlier, Louisville has seen drastic rises in 
fo reclosures over recent years.   Between 2000 and 2002, Louisville experienced approximately 
1, 500 foreclosure complaints resulting in court-ordered auctions due to the recession in the early 
part of the decade (Bourassa, 2003).  Bourassa (2003: 4) states that one-third of these 
fo reclosures were related to predatory lending rooted in “deceptive and in some cases illegal 
practices to  coerce borrowers into unfavorable mortgage agreements.” According to the 
Jefferson County Property Evaluation (JCPVA), there has been a steady increase in the number 
of  foreclosures starting in 2000.  Investor foreclosures did not appear to be a problem until 2004. 
Since then, the number has doubled. 
The Metropolitan Housing Coalition (2008), a local housing advocacy organization in 
Louisville, found that over an six month period one neighborhood had 41 new foreclosures while 
the average neighborhood saw about ten foreclosures.  Some neighborhoods experienced zero 
fo reclosures.  Of the 1,700 foreclosed properties during this time, half had an adjustable rate 
mortgage (ARM), one-third had pre-payment penalties, six percent were interest-only/interest-
first loans, and four percent required a balloon payment. Nine out of ten had closed since 2000, 
with nearly all ARM foreclosures’ sales closing in the past eight years.  Just above half had 
interest rates over 7.6 percent (the “high” cutoff used by MHC) with over 40 percent having 
maximum interest rates over ten percent.  Half were assessed above the median neighborhood 
assessed value for Louisville in 2006 ($103,843) and one-third had loan amounts exceeding the 
median neighborhood sales price for Louisville in 2006 ($114,000).  More than one of every ten 
units foreclosed were built since 2000.  Between 146 and 240, or nine to  1 4 percent, were 12
identified as possible investment properties by MHC. This fact signifies that the foreclosure 
crisis has also affected investors in Louisville, or perhaps that landlords themselves contributed 
to the crisis. 
Properties entering foreclosure during this period were assessed from $5,000 to $825,000.  
These properties had loan amounts ranging from $9,051 to $800,000.  It is clear that the 
fo reclosure crisis did not solely affect a single sub-market of Louisville’s overall housing market. 
At least one multiunit, residential property—an apartment building valued above $1 million—
also entered foreclosure in Louisville during this period. 
While MHC examined foreclosure startsover a short six-month period, we obtained 
fo reclosure sales data from the JCPVA for a five-year period, from 2003-2008. In this analysis, 
we focus on the two-year period 2007 to 2008. Fo reclosure sales data is superior because it 
isolates those foreclosures that completed the entire foreclosure process from default to auction, 
rather than just those that began the process but may have come to another resolution beside 
fo reclosure.  Each of the years between 2006 and 2008 saw approximately 2,000 foreclosure 
sales. From 2004 to 2006, 11 percent of all foreclosures were identified by Louisville’s Office of 
Property Assessors as investor foreclosures. Th e  number of invest or  foreclosures ballooned to 
14 percent in 2007 and nearly one-quarter in 2008. 
Every census tract has at least one foreclosure sale during the two-year analysis period. 
The median number of foreclosures is 24 foreclosures per census tract, with approximately four 
investor foreclosures per tract.  The highest total of foreclosures in a census tract is 90 in an 
inner-city, majority black neighborhood.  Five census tracts have more than 70 foreclosures and 
20 census tracts have more than 50. The median number of foreclosures in majority-black 
neighborhoods (N=32) is 39 per census tract, with 15 of these identified as investor foreclosures. 13
The median number of foreclosure sales in majority-white neighborhoods (N=138) is 20 per 
census tract, with an average of two identified as investor foreclosures.  While there are four 
times as many white neighborhoods, these communities experienced only twice the total amount 
of  foreclosures as non-white neighborhoods. 
Figure 1 graphs foreclosures over the past ten years in Louisville Metro, showing steady 
growth in foreclosure activity since 2002.  Figure 2 displays the growth in investor foreclosures. 
One  sees a noticeable uptick in investor foreclosure in recent years with the number doubling 
between 2006 and 2008.
FIGURES 1& 2 ABOUT HERE
Figure 3 maps neighborhood foreclosure rates.  Higher rates are spread out over roughly 
two-thirds of the city’s territory with other areas showing only minor problems.  A minority of 
neighborhoods have nearly zero foreclosures during the period of analysis.  The highest 
concentrations are in  the western portions of the city, which are mostly poor majority black 
(West End and Newburg, a black suburb) and poor white neighborhoods (South End). Figure 4, 
another map, shows that all investor foreclosures are located in almost exclusively majority black 
neighborhoods in the West End. 
FIGURES 3 & 4 ABOUT HERE
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Our research question, simply put, is: what variables influence variation in neighborhood 
fo reclosures?  Ultimately, we hope to understand why poor black neighborhoods are affected the 
most by the recent crisis.  We introduce the investor variable by specifying “split” models that, in 14
addition to predicting total foreclosures, predict homeowner and investor foreclosures separately.  
This section details the expected effects of our control and test variables.  
Given the severity of the housing crisis and rising foreclosure rates throughout the US, 
we look not only at standard inter-neighborhood variations but also additional forces that may be 
impacting variation inforeclosures (Gilderbloom, 2008).  As noted above, most recent studies 
published have compared neighborhoods across cities (Grover, Smith, and Todd, 2008; 
Immergluck and Smith, 2005; Pederson and Delgadillo, 2007).  These findings indicate that the 
hi ghest foreclosure rates are found in the central city, or at the very least neighborhoods with 
urban characteristics (Immergluck and Smith, 2005; Pederson and Delgadillo, 2007). The 
strategy of looking at neighborhoods within cities has proven to be accepted by scholars (Song 
and Keeling, 2010; Ambrosius, et al.  2009; Gilderbloom, 2009).  However, in the aftermath of 
the recent housing boom and the beginning reemergence and gentrification of neighborhoods 
closer to downtown, anecdotal evidence suggests that foreclosure rates are also high in outlying 
suburbs and exurbs (Lloyd, 2008; MHC, 2007). 
Given the previous research, we believe that percent nonwhite and unemployment rate 
will exert positive effects on neighborhood foreclosures, while median housing value will exert a 
negative effect (Immergluck and Smith, 2005; Pederson and Delgadillo, 2007). Recent housing 
appreciation and median housing age are somewhat unpredictable (Pederson and Delgadillo, 
2007).  Wh ile some may believe that median housing age and appreciation have a positive effect 
on foreclosures due to the rise in subprime lending in older, poorer neighborhoods, we suspect 
that historic, urban neighborhoods have increased in value for other reasons and that the true 
di rection of these variables may be negative. 15
In  an attempt to better understand how neighborhood structures impact foreclosures, we 
decided to look at walkability—as still relatively unexplored variable.   Previous studies have 
fo und that walkability can positively impact housing values and other quality of life variables 
like health (CEO's for Cities, 2009; Carr, et  al., 2010; Rentella, 2009; Pivo and Fisher, 2010; 
Armstrong and Greene, 2009).  Thus far no studies have linked walkability
i and foreclosures. 
Wepredict that the more walkable a neighborhood, the greater the house values. In  addition, 
neighborhood walkability may be correlated with foreclosures because of recent shifts in the 
housing and energy markets.  Given drastic increases in fuel costs, and thus commuting costs, 
walkable neighborhoods are more desirable and, as a result, less impacted by the bursting 
bubble.  Non-walkable neighborhoods—lacking employment opportunities and amenities within 
walkable distances—are expected to experience greater numbers of foreclosures. 
In  addition to analyzing the effect of walkability, our key contribution to understanding 
variation in  n eighborhood foreclosures involves separate analyses of homeowner and investor 
fo reclosures.  Investors (also known as “speculators”) are those who own property not 
considered their primary residence(s).  We note that the number of investor foreclosures doubled 
from 2007 to 2008.  We split the dependent variable into homeowner and investor foreclosures, 
allowing us to explore the factors that influence each rather than just those factors influencing 
total foreclosures.  Investment foreclosures have been largely overlooked or never properly 
captured so it could be used in a regression equation.  We hypothesize that as the number of 
investors increases in a neighborhood, the higher the number of foreclosures.  Furthermore, we 
believe race is an important positive factor when predicting investor foreclosures.  For 
homeowner foreclosures, walkability is expected to exert negative pressure on foreclosures while 
hi gh cost loans will positively influence foreclosures.  16
Data and Methodology 
We explain neighborhood foreclosure sales with the following ten independent variables, 
with the fin al three variables rotated in and out of the statistical models: (1) distance to the 
central business district (CBD) in miles; (2) total jobs per square mile, 2000 Census; (3) percent 
of non-white residents, 2000 Census; (4) percent of vacant units, 2000 Census; (5) median 
housing age in years, 2000 Census; (6) to tal crimes per 100,000 residents, 2007 Louisville Metro 
Police Department; (7) number of high interest rate loans in a neighborhood, 2007-2008 HMDA; 
(8) median household income, 2000 Census;(9) median housing value (MAV), 2006 Jefferson 
County Property Valuation Administrator (JCPVA); (10) walkability in dex. 
The unit of analysis is neighborhoods operationalize as census tracts.  Louisville covers 
170 census tracts in the year 2000 so our  analytic sample contains 170 cases. Ta ble 1 contains 
descriptive statistics for all variables.  Median housing value is the 2006 median assessed value, 
measured in thousands of dollars for the regression. The average neighborhood had an average 
assessed value of approximately $118,000 in 2006.  Neighborhood housing age is the median 
unit age from the 2000 Census measured in years.  Some downtown neighborhoods are over 150 
years old, while younger outer suburbs are only tenyears old.  We use the 2000 age because of 
unknown levels of new construction over the previous eight years and the unavailability of more 
recent data.  Percent nonwhite is the portion of the total population of each tract not identifying 
as “white only” in the 2000 Census.  Neighborhoods range from 1.4 percent minorities to 99.4 
percent minorities.  Unemployment rate is the proportion of the labor force not employed during 
the 2000 Census.  An average of six percent of each neighborhood workforce is unemployed in 
Louisville, although some neighborhoods reach as high as one-th ird.  More recent measures of 17
unemployment are not available below the county or metropolitan level. We  use census tract-
level crime rates for total violent and property crimes for 2007.   We use HMDA data to develop 
a measure of the raw number of high interest home and investor loans for each census tract.  We 
use walk-score which is a measure of neighborhood walkability and  counts access to amenities 
from stores, parks and services.  
TA BLE 1 AB OUT HERE
We measure the dependent variable in several ways: (1) raw number of total foreclosure 
sales for each tract in 2007 and 2008; (2) raw number of homeowner foreclosures for each tract
over the period; and (3) raw number of in vestor foreclosures  for each tract over the same period.  
Investor foreclosures represent about one fifth of all foreclosures in Louisville. The multivariate 
analysis relies on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models predicting variation in 
neighborhood foreclosure sales. Th e equation for the full metro sample is: 
Foreclosures[total, homeowner, or investor]= β0 + β1*Distance to  CD B+ β2*Jobs per Square 
Mile+ β3*Pe rcent Non-White+ β4*Percent Vacant Un its+ β5* Median Housing Age+ 
β6*Crimes per 100,000+ β7*High-Interest Loans + β8*Median Household Income +   β9*MA V 
+ β10*Walkability + ε, where β1 through β10 are the coefficients to be estimated and ε is the 
error term. 
All models shown were tested for multicollinearity by calculating tolerance scores and 
looking at zero order correlation coefficients. The tables  shown along with alternative 
specifications address  the concerns of possible  multicollinearity.  Nearly all the variables in the 
equations had “no  serious” multi-colinearity problems meeting the  standard of  zero order 
correlation among independent variables not being higher than .75  or low tolerance scores (18
Beck-Lewis, 1993-1994; Beck-Lewis, 1980;  Appelbaum, et. al., 1991, Gilderbloom et. al., 
1992). 
Nevertheless, aswe suspected neighborhood median assessed housing value and 
neighborhood median household income were highly correlated.  Sowe rotated these two 
variables into each regression specification 1 and 2 found in Tables 2, 3, and 4 to address  this 
issue.  The  ,Pe arson correlation coefficient was .90 with a tolerance score of around .11 for 
these two variables.  Wa lk  score had a zero order correlation of .70  with Di stance to the Central 
Business District and a to lerance score of .20 which is acceptable for most but  as a precaution 
we  only  added in walkscore in equation 3 in Tables 2, 3 and 4.  Not shown is an additional 
regression run which rotated out Distance to the Central Business District from the equation 
(which the was .70 with Walk Score) and again we found that that the, sign, beta weight  and 
explained variation remained the same for the key findings concerning interest:race, high 
interest loan counts and the kind of investor. 
Regression Results 
Table 2 examines the relationship between total foreclosures and the several predictor
variables.  We specify the model three ways—rotating median income and median housing value 
in the first two models, respectively, and adding walkability alongside median housing value in 
the third model.  Each model explains roughly three-fourths of the variation in to tal 
fo reclosures—with the third model containing walkability exhibiting th e highest adjusted R-
Square of .761. As expected, percent non-white has a significant positive impact on overall 
fo reclosures—meaning that as the percentage of black residents rises, so do foreclosures.  Aside 
from employment density and median value, all other predictors in models 1 and 2 are also 
positive.  Most variables are statistically significant in one or more, in many cases all, of the 19
models.  Total number of high interest rate loans is the most powerful predictor of foreclosures
judging by the beta value of approximately .65.  In the third specification, the walkability index 
exhibits a significant, though modest, negative impact on foreclosures.
TA BLE 2 AB OUT HERE
Table 3 presents th e results of the models with the number of investor foreclosures as the
dependent variable.  Th ese models possess lower but similar R-Squares approaching .70.  When 
we isolate just investor foreclosures, the predictive power of  percent nonwhite (see betas) nearly 
doubles from the previous equation measuring all foreclosures.  In this case, it surpasses high 
interest loans as the most important predictor.  Clearly, these poorly-performing investors 
targeted black neighborhoods.  As was noted in Davis (2009), most speculators were white, lived 
in mostly all white neighborhoods and lived around five to ten miles away   Hi gh interest rate 
loans do predict investor foreclosures but to a lesser extent than for total foreclosures, still 
exhibiting a moderate positive affect.  Walkability is not significant in the third model from 
Table 3, suggesting that walkability is not a factor impacting foreclosure decisions by investors.  
Almost all control variables are significant.  
TA BLE 3 AB OUT HERE
Table 4 presents models predicting foreclosures for owner-occupied housing units. 
Again, R-Sq uare statistics hover around .70.  Interestingly, percent nonwhite is no longer a 
significant predictor in all three equations (using the .05 level).  High interest loans regain their 
strong positive power while walkability nears significance with a negative impact on 
fo reclosures.  Furthermore, many other variables lose their significance in the homeowner 
models—including most of the controls capturing various aspects of neighborhood distress.    
TA BLE 4 AB OUT HERE20
There are several findings worth further explanation and exploration.  First, the specifications are 
a significant improvement over previous research.  Our first advancement was breaking down 
fo reclosures by investors and homeowners.  Our research shows that different social, political 
and economic forces provide distinct explanations of why and how foreclosures occurin 
di fferent neighborhoods.  Our most important finding is that race is not a predictor of homeowner 
foreclosure in Louisville during this period. Second,  race is correlated with high investor 
fo reclosures but these foreclosures are most likely caused by investors (mostly white) exploiting
bl ack neighborhoods. Third , we show that walkable neighborhoods have fewer homeowner 
fo reclosures, although the relationship iswe ak compared to other variables like high interest rate 
loans.  Finally , we showthat the concentration of high cost loans in a neighborhood is strongly 
correlated with neighborhood foreclosures—an  expected finding that confirms other research.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
All variables confirm our hypotheses by consistently carrying the expected sign. The 
consistency of predictors across three distinct analysis periods displays the robustness of our 
model for predicting foreclosures with high R squares. Our model looking at variations in 
neighborhoods shows that the impact of racial composition in the foreclosure crisis may have 
been exaggerated by prior research that did not take into consideration the role of investors,
concentration of high  interest rates loans in neighborhoods,  and walkability. Investor- owned 
property in these neighborhoods cause a great deal of havoc.  Our maps show that that where you 
have a high concentration of  blacks you also have a higher share  of investor owned properties 
and low walk-ability scores---these two variables help explain the high number of foreclosures in 
bl ack neighborhoods (see Figures 3 and 4).  Moreover, not all low income black neighborhoods 
are cursed with  h igh foreclosures rates.  Indeed our research finds several majority-bl ack 21
neighborhoods with only a small number of foreclosures in 2007 and 2008, including one 
neighborhood that has none. The difficulty lies indisentangling these variables and trying to 
determine causationover correlation. But we need to rethink the conventional wisdom of an 
association between neighborhood racial composition and foreclosure rates.  Policymakers must 
recognize that a key cause of this crisis is investors who do not live in the neighborhood and are 
not culturally or financially astute about certain neighborhood housing markets.  One foreclosed 
home in a neighborhood can have a domino effect and destroy a neighborhood and its quality of 
life.    
Another issue is the extent to which mortgage facilities target black neighborhoods with 
risky and exotic loan products. According to the Federal Reserve Board, when subprime lending 
peaked in 2006, 47 percent of borrowers in minority neighborhoods received high-priced risky 
loans, compared to 22 percent in white communities (Avery et al. 2007).   Given the increased 
risk of foreclosure in neighborhoods with higher interest rates and loan-to-value ratios, 
policymakers should encourage standard, fixed-rate mortgages.  This could break the cycle of 
risky mortgages forcing risky borrowers into default and foreclosure, thereby limiting bad 
decisions on the part of banks and borrowers alike. 
Policies such as flipping real estate are hurtful schemes where neighborhoods with the 
lowest housing prices are targeted by nefarious investors as commodities for exchange value, and 
not neighborhoods of use value (Logan and Molotch, 1987).  Our related research studies how 
members of a nearly all white 500 person real estate investor club in Louisville learn the art of 
get rich schemes that target low income neighborhoods. This organization, and others like them, 
teach members how to flip properties quickly and deceptively fool banks by buying a piece of 
property, exchange the property to a dummy entity at an inflated price, make minimal repairs 22
(usually painting and landscaping), refinance it at three to four times the original purchase price, 
cash out, and then walk away (Gilderbloom, 2008). 
Investor behavior is one important cause of why these neighborhoods face so many 
fo reclosures that has not been recognized by previous research or policy.  Researchers and 
policymakers must complement what they have learned about race, unemployment, predatory 
lending, and other practices that contribute to rising foreclosures and examine these destructive
investment practices.  The incidence of foreclosure, the large foreclosure gap between white and 
non-white neighborhoods, and other costs would be greatly reduced if the gap in investor 
fo reclosures did not exist. 
If Louisville’s experience is indicative of other mid-sized cities, the foreclosure crisis is 
indeed taking its toll, particularly on poor and working class neighborhoods downtown and in the 
suburbs.   The scapegoatin g of government policy and black borrowers in conservative circles 
fo r the foreclosure crisis is misplaced.   The liberal emphasis on predatory lending and the rising 
unemployment is more on target but is incomplete. The investor gap needs to be at the center of 
future policy and research. The “Great Recession” is threatening to undue urban gains that were 
achieved in the 1990s.  On the other hand, rising costs of transportation, the problematic 
dynamics of sprawl generally, and the growing interest in “smart growth” initiatives around the 
country may encourage a re-centralization ofmetropolitan areas.  Our evidence of fewer 
fo reclosures in the older, gentrified neighborhoods of East Louisville provides evidence that such 
a trend may well be in the works.
There ar e non-spatial explanations for foreclosures, such as job loss, divorce, and 
prolonged illness, we analyze how foreclosures vary from one neighborhood to another in a city. 
Our literature review reveals that little attention has been placed on the spatial dynamics of 23
fo reclosures.  We show several variables significantly affecting foreclosures that are not part of 
the discussion on foreclosures. 
While we are not surprised to find that poor and majority-black neighborhoods have 
hi gher foreclosures, we are surprised to find that suburbs outside the beltway(s) are now 
experiencing similar problems with foreclosures.    As we have argued elsewhere, outer-ring 
suburbs are having difficulties because of rising travel costs and a cultural shift towards green, 
urban lifestyles (Ambrosius et. al.,, 2010). The potential for increased fuel prices, which 
nationally surpassed $4.00 a gallon in mid-2008 and again in 2011, will no doubt intensify 
current trends.  These recent developments might also explain how a neighborhood needing less 
driving and greater walkability have lower foreclosure rates. 
This research contributes significantly to our  understanding of the foreclosure crisis. 
Further work must be done in other U.S. cities to examine the validity and reliability of our 
model. We believe that the significant variables from this study will remain good predictors of 
neighborhood foreclosures in other cities.    Our examination of investor related behavior, 
walkability, and high-interest rate foreclosures have enabled us to understand how these factors 
cause higher foreclosures rates in black neighborhoods.   It is possible to speculate that these are 
the factors that create the much higher bump in foreclosures in black neighborhoods. 24
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i This variable is an approximate measure of neighborhood walkability.  The WalkScore is based on 10 variables and 
the distance between those variables and the location specified. These variables are: Restaurants, Coffee Shops, 
Gr oceries, Shopping, Schools, Parks, Book Stores, Bars, Entertainment (movie theatres, theatres, music halls, etc.) 
and Post Offices. These ten examples serve as good baseline measurement for the walkability of each 
Formatted: Line spacing: Double31
                                                                                                                                                                       
neighborhood.   As Joe Cortright (2009: 09) has noted Walk Score can promote green urbanism as well and can be 
a value :
“Walk Score is a measure of the proximity or a range of typical goods, services and activities to a particular 
household.  As a result, locations with high Walk Scores are not only more conducive to walking, they are also 
similarly more conducive to cycling and are more likely to be more well served by transit.  In addition, because a 
wide range of activities are available close at hand, locations with high Walk Scores enable households to drive 
shorter distances when they do choose to travel by car.”
The walkability variable was developed by walkscore.com by using the geographic centroid from each census tract, 
then pulling the closest real world address to that centroid. We then used this as a proxy for the remaining area to 
get an approximation of the walk score for each tract (Author, 2010). Measuring walkability by using 
WalkScore.com has already been accepted in several scholarly papers as a reasonable measure of walkability. . The 
walkable score ratings seem to be a good approximation of Louisville neighborhoods that are both walkable and 
non-walkable. Scores that are generally lower than 50 are car dependant locations where there are not a lot of 
amenities that a person can walk to, 50-69 is Somewhat Walkable, 70-89 is Very Walkable and 90-100 is 
considered to be a "Walkers Paradise," (WalkScore.com, 2010; Author 2010).  So any bias to this measure remains 
constant across all neighborhoods.  Additional destinations to walk to and from could be added to this measure in 
the future by the company. 32
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